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Photography Sets the Image Free1 
 
 
Thankyou all for coming, it’s so lovely to see you here. It means a lot to me. I have been told 
different things about inaugural lectures by friends: to speak about the direction of my own 
research and how I came to my current research projects, to acknowledge influences, to talk 
about my teenage passions (!) I might subtly do a little bit of the last two, but mainly, I plan 
to talk about something which is an enduring passion of mine, the writing of the early-
twentieth century critic Walter Benjamin. For those of you who haven’t heard of him, he was 
German, Jewish and Marxist and his most significant writing was produced in the period 
from 1920 until his death in 1940. I am not so much talking about Benjamin as talking about 
photography through and with him. I am also going to talk a bit about concepts of freedom.  
 
This is because, when I was thinking about inaugural lectures, and what they are and what 
they are for, I began to think about what my own investment is in being an artist and an 
academic, in making and studying. For me, when I was growing up as a girl, reading and 
making were a means to escape a certain kind of horribly limiting self-consciousness that 
feminist theorists have described since the 1920s.2 Instead of acting in the world, we watch 
ourselves acting, we critique our own appearances, we catch our reflections in shop windows, 
we ask anxiously for reassurance about our performance in a lecture. To become a woman is 
to watch ourselves being watched, but when I read or draw, I can forget myself, when I take 
photographs, I watch everything but myself (most of the time anyway). This is going to 
sound corny, but I think my own personal investment is that in making and study, I find small 
ways to be free. This idea of freedom is about something the media theorist Vilém Flusser’s 
calls “that disregard of self, that absorption in work”, that destroys the distinction between 
work and play.3  
                                                
1 This is the transcript of a public lecture. It is addressed to a wide audience, and so some arguments are made 
as accessible as I could manage, hopefully without too much simplification. The case it makes for academia as a 
space for a certain kind of freedom is made in the context of specific changes in British higher education, and of 
my own career, and is not intended as a generalized defence of a Kantian ideal of the university. 
2 For example see Rivière, “Womanliness as Masquerade”, Berger, Ways of Seeing, 46-7, Doane, 
“Misrecognition and Identity”. 
3 Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images, 95. 
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Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that I am so keen to make the argument that photography 
unfixes things, that it sets the image free. But I also want to talk about photography and 
freedom for reasons that are not just personal. As an academic and an artist I am also 
interested in ideas of artistic and academic freedom. I am conscious that I am speaking when 
many of my colleagues in other institutions are on strike over changes to their pension 
scheme, and that many of us view this as a dispute that is not just about pensions but about 
the value placed on education and on academia. So, here I want to address the value of these 
practices, not their value as instruments in the service of industry, social policy and profit, but 
an aspect of their bigger value, which is the way in which they allow all of us to cultivate 
certain ways of thinking and being.  
 
So, I am going to talk about photography, and about Benjamin, and I am going to show you 
photographs. Through the lecture I hope you will also get a sense of why I do this kind of 
research. Knowing that you all come from all sorts of different backgrounds, with different 
kinds of expertise, I am going to try to take you with me through something I find hard to 
think about and which therefore, I think is worth thinking about. It is fine if you don’t get the 
sense of a fully coherent argument, but leave the room with thoughts of Epicurean Gods, of 
stars that penetrate telescopes and fossils that look at us, of Scottish shawls and silver nitrate, 
of poisoned blood and Napoleonic wars, of photographing pigeons and hollow-boned aliens. 
 
This lecture is going to centre around unravelling one phrase in Walter Benjamin’s 1931 
essay which is called “Little History of Photography”, or “A Small History of Photography”, 
depending on which translation you are using. And the phrase I am going to focus on is here 
in German and in a couple of different translations below: “light wrests itself agonisingly 
from the darkness”, or “light separates itself reluctantly from shadow”. It’s a phrase he uses 
to describe the 1840s images by Scots photographers David Octavius Hill and Robert 
Adamson (though like other writers at the time, Benjamin credits these photographs entirely 
to Hill, pictured here in a photograph by Adamson).   
 
So, taking this phrase as a starting point, I am aiming to move us away from the conventional 
ways of talking about what happens when a photograph is taken. Away from the language of 
capture and stalking, of snapping and shooting and taking a photograph; away too, from the 
idea of taking a photograph as a “soft murder” (which is what Susan Sontag called it) and 
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away from ideas about the photograph as fact, evidence, and even, as representation.4 All of 
these ideas are associated with the common-sense understanding of photography as a static 
medium that “freezes” the moment. This characterisation privileges certain kinds of practice, 
drawing a sharp distinction between photography and moving-image media such as film and 
video. It imagines the photograph as primarily a print, and it underpins arguments about how 
new or different digital images are.  
 
Against this, I take the view that what photography does is set the image free. By images I 
don’t just mean pictures, that is, I am not just thinking of photography as a means of 
reproduction. As you know the category of images can include literary images, and mental 
images. Images in this sense are not necessary substantial material things. Photography, both 
chemical and digital, allows images to be projected, reproduced and transmitted. It unhooks 
images from one specific surface, material or ground and from their fixed place in time and 
space, and allows them to multiply and to wander, and our imaginations to wander with them. 
In multiplying images, some writers have argued that photography expands and extends the 
imagination, providing us with a larger, more diverse repertoire of images in our minds. (This 
is the kind of unfettering of the image that I talk about in my new book).5 
 
But photography also sets the image free in another way, which is what I will be talking 
about tonight. I am discussing analogies between the technology of photography and the 
capacity of thinking. Through its technical process, photography seems to bring image 
making closer to thought. Flusser, who I mentioned earlier, described photography as a 
technology for “envisioning”, because the photograph arrives all at once, more like an idea 
than, say, a drawing.6  He compared philosophy and photography, suggesting that there was 
something about the act of taking a photograph that brings it close to the process of 
philosophizing.7 And Benjamin seems to draw a similar analogy, suggesting that photography 
can be a technical equivalent for thinking. He finds this in instantaneous photography, which 
appears in a sudden flash, like wit or inspiration; but also, and mainly, in early chemical 
photographs, such as Hill and Adamson’s, which register slowly like reflective thought.     
 
                                                
4 Sontag, On Photography, 15. 
5 Henning, Photography: The Unfettered Image. 
6 Flusser, Into The Universe of Technical Images, 19-21. 
7 Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, particularly the final chapter. 
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The ability of these early photographs to do what I am calling “setting the image free” and 
what Benjamin saw as a technical equivalent to reflective thinking, rests on long-exposure 
times and poor sensitivity (of lenses and plates). By early photographs, I mean photographs 
produced in only two decades: between 1839 when for most photographers it was almost 
impossible to register the human face without it being more than a blurred trace, and the 
1860s when instantaneous photography arrived, with increased photosensitivity of emulsions, 
fast lenses and mechanised shutters. This narrow historical moment between 1839 and 1860 
also brought dramatic social and economic changes in Europe, particularly transformations in 
the social classes, and it laid the ground for modern industrial and commodity capitalism.   
 
As you may know, photography in the 1840s and 1850s was not a medium of mass 
reproduction. The daguerreotype, the first viable photographic process, was completely un-
reproducible, a miracle of chemistry on metal. William Henry Fox Talbot’s groundbreaking 
book of photographs, The Pencil of Nature, used the paper process that he invented, and was 
printed in a limited edition in the 1840s. As photography historians have shown, the process 
was laborious and the prints themselves were unstable and prone to fading  — indeed only 
about 15 copies of the entire book still exist.8   
 
Although even then, photography held out the promise of mass reproduction, for Benjamin 
the photographs from this period are interesting for a different reason. As Benjamin argues 
across several writings, technological modernity and the rise of a new form of global free 
trade capitalism dramatically alters the nature of experience, increasingly challenging our 
ability to assimilate experiences — the things that happen to us — into a larger sense of 
experience as know-how.9  
 
Photography from this period raises questions for Benjamin that are philosophical questions 
about experience, particularly about experience in modernity.  For example, how do we know 
the things of this world when we can only experience them through our senses, through 
                                                
8 Harding, “Introduction”. 
9 This makes more sense in German with the two terms Benjamin uses: Erlebnis and Erfahrung. In “On Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire”, Benjamin writes, “The greater the shock factor in particular impressions, the more 
vigilent consciousness has to be in screening stimuli; the more efficiently it does so, the less these impressions 
enter long experience [Erfahrung], and the more they correspond to the concept of isolated experience 
[Erlebnis]” (319). An earlier (1973) translation gives “tending to remain in the sphere of a certain hour of one’s 
life” which I find clearer . On Benjamin’ theory of experience see also: Hansen, “Cinema and Experience”; 
Elsaesser, “Between Erlebnis and Erfahrung”; Wolin, “Benjamin’s Materialist Theory of Experience”. 
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sensory experiences that we only know through concepts? How has this process of 
perceiving, and sensing, and making sense changed in modernity, and in particular in the 
century between 1839, and 1931, when Benjamin was writing?   
 
Benjamin’s ideas about photography are associated with his Marxist politics — he is 
attempting to understand and describe the relationship between the specific historical 
conditions of capitalist society in this period, and a transformation in experience, which 
affected the ways in which people were able to understand, and perhaps act to change, their 
own situation. But the way he writes about photography is also related to his understanding 
of early German Romantic writings, which date from before Marx. Benjamin wrote his 
doctoral dissertation, which he finished in 1920, on Early German Romanticism.10 These 
writings shaped his understanding of criticism, and of art, and his unique version of historical 
materialism.11 So here I will be going back not only to the beginnings of photography but, 
further, to the moment of Early German Romanticism at the very beginning of the nineteenth 
century. 
 
Benjamin published his “Little History of Photography” in 1931 (this on your right is the 
original text) only a few months after the Viennese art historian and curator Heinrich 
Schwarz had published this book (on your left) on David Octavius Hill. Schwarz’s book was 
highly influential, not least on Benjamin.12 He read Hill and Adamson’s paper calotypes in a 
very particular way, emphasizing their material presence and realism. Schwarz saw these 
qualities as an effect of Hill’s particular artistic sensibility but also the technology —the old, 
slow Chevalier lenses and paper negatives — and he emphasized their superiority over the 
nineteenth-century pictorialist photography that was to follow.13 
 
Pictorialism was a style of photography that used staging, and retouching to stake a claim for 
photography as a medium for art. Pictorialism thrived in the late nineteenth century, but had 
fallen heavily out of fashion in the 1930s. The staged composite photographs of Henry Peach 
                                                
10 Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism”. 
11 This is also argued by John McCole who writes that the dissertation “set the coordinates for all his subsequent 
work”. McCole, Walter Benjamin, 82. 
12 Benjamin and Schwarz’s taste for Hill and Adamson’s photographs is part of a wider German appreciation of 
their work, that had been growing since an 1899 exhibition of their prints at the Hamburg Art Gallery. Schwarz 
was key in shaping and cementing this: by the late 1920s only around 20-30 prints had actually been exhibited 
in Germany and Austria, but Schwartz had acquired 200 on trips to Edinburgh. di Folco, “Hill and Adamson in 
Germany”. 
13 Schwarz, David Octavius Hill: Master of Photography, 1932. 
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Robinson are a key example. Fading Away (1858) shown here, is among the most famous — 
it’s a montage made up of several individual studies. Both Schwarz and Benjamin saw 
pictorialism as very distasteful, as a mistaken approach that undermined photographic realism 
through the overuse of retouching and manipulation and staging. Schwarz argued that when 
photography attempts to detach itself from reality and aspire to the “limitless world” of 
painting and the graphic arts it becomes, in his words, “untrue to itself”, and less, rather than 
more, of an art.  
 
Ironically, though, the reproductions in Schwarz’s book are actually retouched — as you can 
probably see here in the sharp lines of the head against the background, and in the over-
delineated features. In fact the photo historian Larry Schaaf has shown that Hill and Adamson 
regularly retouched their negatives with pencil and pigment, sharpening lines, covering up 
blemishes, or shading in dark areas.14 A second irony is that a number of the Hill and 
Adamson photographs were, in the first place, studies for a painting commemorating the 
founding of the Scottish Free Church in 1843, and they were posed! This is easier to see in 
the group photos such as this one. The people in the images were the actual participants in the 
historical event, so Hill was asking them to pose as themselves, to re-enact their own 
actions.15 
 
Throughout this talk I am using, as Benjamin might have, the illustrations of Hill and 
Adamson’s in Schwarz’s book. How reproduction changes the images is evident from these 
details of two photographs taken of Hill by Adamson at the same time. The left one is a scan 
from a salt print on the National Galleries of Scotland website and the second is re-
photographed by me from Schwarz. What I am interested in here though, is what these 1930s 
writers did with these photographs, what they saw in them, rather than the actual properties of 
the photographs themselves. I think, I would go so far as to say that we can’t find what 
Benjamin found by studying these photographs, since his argument is not really about the 
actual visual or material difference between them and others, although it seems to be.  
 
                                                
14 Schaaf, “Science Art and Talent”, 17. 
15 “Hill was, most extraordinarily, able to use real people as active dramatic models, in their own history and 
while they were still making that history”. Stevenson, “Shadowing Art”, 230. 
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Benjamin drew heavily on Schwarz’s book and the claims that Schwarz made about the 
artistic merit of these pictures. He even lifted that phrase I am focussing on directly from 
Schwarz: it is exactly the same in the German version of Schwarz as in Benjamin’s German 
essay: “ringt sich mühsam das Licht aus dem Dunkel”. Here, on the top is Esther Leslie’s 
translation of Benjamin: ‘light wrests itself agonisingly from the darkness’, below, the 1932 
English translation of Schwarz:  ‘light separates itself reluctantly from shadow’.16  
 
As I said, it is this one phrase that I want to focus on, but to understand it we need to put it in 
the context of some of the other claims being made by Benjamin and Schwarz, and also their 
roots in other, older ideas and writings. Note that both translations include a kind of 
personification of light (“agonisingly”, “reluctantly”) and that the phrase appears, in both 
texts, in reference to the long exposure times needed for these photographs, which was 
apparently thirty seconds in full sunlight, and in the context of a comparison of Hill’s 
photographs to mezzotints. 
 
Mezzotint is a printing process in which a full range of tones (from darks through mid-tones 
to white) is achieved through the use of a tool that produces tiny pits over the whole surface 
of the metal plate. There are two methods: dark to light and light to dark. In the dark to light 
version, which is more common, the whole plate is roughened to render it able to print only 
black. Then the highlights and midtones are achieved by various degrees of smoothing and 
burnishing, with the completely smooth areas printing white. In other words, the highlights 
are rescued out of the darkness, laboriously.  
 
In Schwarz’s book, the sentence about light leads into a longer discussion of mezzotint:  
 
 “As in mezzotint, the light struggles laboriously out of the darkness: soft halftones 
emerge from the deepest shadows and convey the transition to luminous brightness of 
the heads and hands. As in mezzotint, a flowing chiaroscuro surrounds the bodies and 
harmoniously binds the space and people into one. As in mezzotint, the material appeal 
of the surface becomes an experience: cravats made of shimmering satin, waistcoats in 
glossy velvet, collars of thick fur and shawls made of soft Scottish wool.”17 
                                                
16 Benjamin, “Small History”, 81; Schwarz, David Octavius Hill, 39. 
17 Schwarz. This is my translation from the 1931 German edition which reads: “Wie auf Schabkunstblättern 
ringt sich mühsam das Licht aus dem Dunkel: Weiche Halbtöne tauchen aus tiefsten Schatten empor und 
vermitteln den Übergang zu leuchtenden Helligkeiten der Köpfe und Hände. Wie auf SchabkunstBlättern 
umspielt ein fliessendes Hell-Dunkel die Körper und verbindet harmonisch den Raum und die Menschen zur 
Einheit.Wie auf SchabkunstBlättern wird der stoffliche Reiz der Oberfläche zum Erlebnus:Halsbinden aus 
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Schwarz was arguing that Hill and Adamson’s paper photographs, or calotypes, are less 
linear and have greater tonal range than other processes such as the daguerreotype and than 
other calotypes by different photographers (certainly they were technically finer than other 
calotypes of the time). They look like mezzotints in the way the light seems to have been 
worked, or worked its own way, out of a dark base, so that only head and hands are fully lit. 
This technique gives a much greater sense of materiality, emphasising the clothes in 
particular.  
 
For Benjamin, though, the phrase suggests more than just a comparison with mezzotint. He 
doesn’t actually mention Schwarz in the “Little History”, but he does quote the artist-
printmaker Emil Orlik, who had published an essay in 1924 called “On Photography”. Orlik 
had claimed that long-exposure was what gave “greatness” or “grandeur” to early 
photographs in contrast to later photography. A “technical weakness” – the insensitivity of 
early photography– becomes an aesthetic strength. Orlik wrote that the long exposure time 
gave a “synthesis of expression” and a stillness to the subjects; Benjamin quotes this and adds 
that the sitters are not captured “in the moment” as in a snapshot, but seem to grow into it.18  
 
This term “synthesis of expression” comes from yet another writer, the philosopher 
Schelling, who in 1804, wrote this:   
 
 “The true art of portraiture would consist in embracing the idea of a person that has 
dispersed into the individual gestures and moments of life, to collect the composite of 
this idea into one moment and in this way make the portrait . . . more like the person 
himself, that is, the idea of the person, than he himself is in any one of the individual 
moments.” 19 
 
So, the synthetic portrait would seem to be the opposite of the photograph, which is based 
around one short moment of exposure. But Orlik and Benjamin seem to suggest that such a 
                                                                                                                                                  
schimmernder Atlasseide, Westen aus mettglänzendem Samt, Kragen aus dichtem Pelz und Schals aus weichem 
schottischen Tuch.” 
18 Orlik, “Über Photographie”, in Kleine Aufsätze (1924). Benjamin , “Small History”, 72. Benjamin writes, as 
does Schwarz, “Wie auf Schabkunstblättern ringt sich mühsam das Licht aus dem Dunkel”. In Esther Leslie’s 
translation, the context is: “As in mezzotints, in a Hill [the light struggles laboriously out of the darkness: Orlik 
speaks of the “comprehensive illumination” caused by the long period of exposure, which gives ‘greatness to 
these early photographs’.” In the translation included in Benjamin’s Selected Writings the similarity to Schwarz 
is disguised because of the introduction of a new word into the sentence: “The way light struggles out of 
darkness in the work of a Hill is reminiscent of mezzotint” [my emphasis]. Benjamin, “Little History”, 517.  
19 Schelling cited in Brevern,“Resemblance After Photography”, 8. 
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synthesis of expression is possible in the early long exposure photograph. The time of the 
exposure allows the subject to settle into the pose, in an attitude of waiting enhanced by the 
fact that they had not sat for a photograph before, and had not yet learnt to present themselves 
to the camera. They sit still, and they wait. 
 
Orlik tried to explain the effect of the sitter’s stillness on the viewer by quoting the famous 
German writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, as well as Schelling. Goethe, Orlik reminded 
his readers, had described a person sat as if “where it neither rains nor snows and no storm 
blows”.20 This description was actually already a quotation — a phrase from the Roman 
author Lucretius’s influential text De Rerum Natura (which translates as On the Nature of 
Things) from the year 50 BCE (this is a 17th century edition).21 Lucretius, of course, was not 
using the phrase to describe how still a sitter must sit for a long exposure photograph. Instead 
he was describing the realm of the gods: “where it neither rains nor snows and no storm 
blows”.22  His theory was that the universe was not created by the Roman gods, but formed 
by atoms that had existed for eternity. He did not deny the existence of deities, but he did not 
believe in an interventionist God. Following the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, he 
argued that the gods lived outside in another realm, indifferent to human struggles, in this 
place “where it neither rains nor snows and no storm blows”. 
 
So, Orlik’s quotation implies that these early long exposure photographs, present their still 
and patient sitters like the Epicurean gods, sat outside and above human affairs. To be outside 
the storm is to be outside of time and history: this is the kind of transcendence that Orlik 
associates with great art. He suggests that early photographs withstand comparison with 
painted portraits because of the utter stillness, and sense of remoteness given to them by the 
technical restrictions.  
 
But in Goethe’s time the figure of the storm had an additional and specific meaning: it had 
become a dominant symbol for the historical rupture produced by the French revolution and 
                                                
20 Orlik is actually writing about an 1843 photograph by Hermann Blow, “It forces itself to the calm, soothing 
attitude that Goethe describes in the account of the portrait of Talleyrand’ by Gérard.” On the influence of Orlik 
on Benjamin see also Bruggeman, Walter Benjamin. 
21 Goethe wrote: “We could not help being reminded of the Epicurean gods who dwell, “where it neither rains 
nor snows and no storm blows”: this man sits there so peacefully, unmolested by all the storms that rage around 
him” (Goethe, Über Kunst und Altertum).This translation is from Prandi, “Dare to be Happy!”, 13-14. Prandi 
also explains that the phrase is from De Rerum Natura book 2.  She describes Goethe himself as having 
increasingly a “Lucretian resignation”.  
22 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura. 
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its chaotic aftermath in the shape of the Terror, the subsequent invasion of German territories 
by France in the French revolutionary wars, and then the Napoleonic wars.23  And Goethe 
was not talking about art in general, but a specific painting by François Gérard. It is a portrait 
of a figure who had been at the heart of this specific storm, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand 
Perigord, otherwise known as Talleyrand. Gérard started to paint this portrait in 1807, the 
year Talleyrand, weary of Napoleon’s warmongering, had resigned as Napoleon’s foreign 
minister, reportedly saying “I do not wish to be Europe’s executioner”.24  So Talleyrand steps 
outside the storm, and in the painting, Goethe felt, his expression seems to be an almost 
unbearable impassivity.  
 
So Orlik turns a comment about a particular painting, with a specific historical meaning, into 
a description of art as something autonomous, something that has its own purposes and sits 
outside history. The question for Orlik is whether photography can also transcend history in 
this way. But Benjamin is interested in something else. He is paying attention to photography 
as a process and as an encounter, and he does this in a way that is informed by his close 
reading of two early German Romantics: the philosophers Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. 
Schlegel and Novalis believed that art is autonomous, but in a sense that is different than for 
Orlik. It is not that art transcends society and history, but that artworks are active, lively 
things in their own right, able to generate their own meanings to the receptive and sensitive 
viewer. In fact, as Benjamin argued in his dissertation, they treated both art and nature in a 
way that was almost animist, as things that are active and acting on us.25   
 
The Romantics theorised that there is a reality external to consciousness (a word of things-in-
themselves) but that we can’t directly access these things. Instead, what we can access are the 
representations that appear to our senses, which are themselves already constructs of the 
mind. So they see the mind operating at two levels: there is an initial level which is to do with 
sensation, perception and proprioception; and then there is a higher level which is the level of 
reflexive self-consciousness through which thinking becomes aware of thinking, and through 
                                                
23 On the significance of the storm in Romanticism see Seyhan, “What is Romanticism”, 6-8. 
24 David Lawday, Napoelon’s Master, 183. 
25 The Early German Romantics took the view that an artwork could be understood through an act of 
contemplation, as Benjamin puts it “without reference to theory or morality”. Benjamin, cited in Steiner, Walter 
Benjamin, 51. On the Early German romantic conception of art’s autonomy see also Stoljar , 10–11. In his 
dissertation, Benjamin cites Schlegel’s critique of Sturm und Drang art connoisseurshio , in connection to his 
awareness “of the analogy between aesthetic and epistemological problematics” “The Concept of Criticism”, 
143. An analogy which Benjamin also draws and which I am drawing here — i.e. between the aesthetic 
character of an image and the question of how we might know things. 
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which we are able to think of ourselves as  “I”, as “me, thinking this, now”. At neither level is 
there direct access or knowledge of the world, of the reality outside. That does not mean that 
we can’t know the external world, however. Instead, how we know objects depends on this 
higher-level thinking, this ability to reflect. “Reflection” isn’t a very helpful word, as it’s 
actually a visual metaphor relating to mirrors. Reflection gives the illusion of fixedness — we 
reflect on something already stable and given. But this is not what Schlegel, Novalis and 
Benjamin mean.  
 
The feminist writer Donna Haraway proposes diffraction as a better metaphor than 
reflection.26 In science, diffraction or interference patterns are those produced by the 
overlapping or change in the pattern of waves when they encounter one another — think of 
raindrops on water — or this photogram by Berenice Abbot made by placing the 
photographic paper below a shallow tank of water. Feminist physicist Karen Barad says that 
diffraction, unlike reflection, suggests an encounter with something different from oneself — 
as she says, it “makes manifest the extraordinary liveliness of the world”.27  
 
Similarly for the Early German Romantics, our reflective thinking is not purely solitary and 
inward looking; instead, it is a means to encounter other things, which are lively even if, like 
stones or fossils, they are strictly speaking inanimate. For the Romantics, as Benjamin 
explained, it is not only humans who reflect, in order to reflect, something does not have to 
be a self, or to have a mind.28 For Novalis and Schlegel, observation is only possible because 
of the object’s own self-reflective activity: we can only perceive something at all if it can 
perceive itself. But reality also looks back at us: famously, Novalis wrote “In all predicates in 
which we see the fossil, it sees us”. 29 
 
For Novalis, Benjamin says, “to observe a thing means only to arouse it to self-
recognition”.30 Benjamin calls this “magical observation”. Observation is a process of mutual 
                                                
26 Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters”. 
27 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 28. 
28 In “The Concept of Criticism”, Benjamin summarises, “Everything that is in the absolute, everything real, 
thinks; because this thinking is that of reflection, it can think only itself , or more precisely, only its own 
thinking” (144) and further “All knowledge is self-knowledge of a thinking being, which does not need to be an 
“I”” (145). 
29 Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism”, 145; Novalis Philosophical Writings. 
30 Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism”, 148. 
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activity, as Novalis put it: “the stars penetrate the telescope”.31 In other words, the thing 
being seen actively constitutes itself in the eye of the beholder.   
 
Novalis and Schlegel were Romantic poets as well as philosophers, with a strong mystical 
impulse. As Benjamin points out, mysticism encompasses two contradictory tendencies: on 
the one hand what Novalis called a “longing for the infinite” a drive towards absolute 
comprehension, and on the other, a tolerance for the unknown and unknowable and what 
cannot be communicated. Schlegel and (especially) Novalis emphasised the impossibility of 
total knowledge and the infinite nature of reflection, which has no end, since there is no 
possibility of arriving at a conclusion, at an absolute knowledge.32  
 
It is perfectly credible to argue that the Early German Romantics were indulging in a mad 
form of mysticism and equally credible to argue that they actually anticipated aspects of 
quantum physics. For them, as for the quantum physicist, observation is not a neutral, 
detached and disinterested practice where the object is unaffected by its being observed, or, 
as Karen Barad says “space, time and matter” do not come before the moment of observation: 
things come into being in the experiment.33 Writing in around 1800, they challenged a view 
that even now many photographers cling to, which is that observing something leaves that 
thing untouched and unchanged. They also challenged another persistent blindspot in 
Western thought, which is the tendency to think of matter as mute, dead and inactive, as raw 
material for our exploitation.   
 
Neither Novalis nor Schlegel ever saw a photograph— poor Novalis died a couple of months 
before his 29th birthday in 1801. Schlegel, though born in the same year, outlived him by 
nearly 30 years, but even he did not live to see the invention of photography announced in 
                                                
31 Novalis. Philosophical Writings. Benjamin points out that the notion of perception as “an interpenetration of 
subject and object” appears in Democritus before Novalis: “The Concept of Criticism”, 147. 
32 The Romantic commitment to not-knowing which had been described more recently by Manfred Frank as 
skepticism toward the metaphysical idea of the absolute (Frank 56), is characterised (though not condemned) by 
Benjamin as mysticism. Frank, Manfred. The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, New 
York: SUNY Press, 2012. The phrase “longing for the infinite” (Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen ) is discussed 
by Frank, 29. Frank argues that Schlegel and Novalis broke with Kant in that they did not subscribe to the idea 
of a ground or foundation in philosophy, an absolute, something “unconditioned” or prior to the activity of 
thinking. By contrast, as Benjamin sees it, in their writing the absolute becomes the medium of thought. Either 
way, without foundation in something external to itself, thought (or the process of philosophizing) is infinite. 
There is no higher principle that can be appealed to (Frank 33). Unhooked from this higher principle, reflexive 
self-consciousness, in which we posit ourselves as an “I” becomes an infinite process that produces the “I”. To 
put it another way, the self does not pre-exist the act of thinking itself.  
33 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway. 
 13 
1839. Yet, the example of the telescope suggests we could think of magical observation in 
and through another optical apparatus, the photographic camera.  
 
Let’s go back again to Benjamin’s commentary on these early photographs. Imagine the sitter 
growing into the photograph, imagine the slow, painful, agonising, reluctant, separation of 
light and shadow that produces the image in these early photographs with their slow exposure 
times. Forget what you know about the speed of light and instead picture the light wresting 
itself from the darkness, struggling to reach the sensitive surface, across a gulf that is more 
than just the gap between sitter and camera. Picture it being met by paper soaked in 
chemicals that slowly registers its presence, that pulls the light into itself and allows itself to 
be transformed. What we have here is a technical equivalent for the Romantic process of 
magical observation, in which two reflecting beings (an object and a photographic apparatus) 
radiate into one another. In the process, Benjamin suggests, they make possible the 
experience of what he terms aura. 
 
Benjamin’s concept of aura is notoriously difficult and has been written about extensively so 
I don’t want to dwell too much on it here, except to show how this is linked to the Romantic 
concept of magical observation.34 Famously, Benjamin defined aura as “A strange weave of 
space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close the 
object may be.”35 The object radiates itself towards us, but the moment we grasp it is also the 
moment we recognise the gulf between us and it, between “I” and “Not-I”. It only become 
thinkable, perceivable, because it has become like us, but at the same time it withdraws, back 
to its alien otherness. Think of the stars again, thousand or millions of light years away and 
yet here, now, in the telescope. It is this simultaneous absence and presence, this oscillation 
across space and time, which constitutes the aura.  
 
Generally, for Benjamin, photographs don’t have aura, the pictures by Hill and Adamson are 
a rare exception. This is difficult to understand especially as it is so easy to confuse aura with 
atmosphere, value, uniqueness. Lets take an example: 
 
                                                
34 For a useful discussion of aura, see Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura”. 
35 Esther Leslie's translation in Benjamin, “Small History” is slightly different — this is the version from the 
Selected Writings, "Little History", 518. 
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Here is a picture of Lilian, great aunt of my husband, not long before her 17th birthday. A 
smile seems to play around her lips, she looks cheeky and fun. In a few months she will 
accidentally kneel on a needle and die from blood poisoning. As Benjamin writes about a 
different image, knowing her story we seek what he calls “the tiny spark of contingency”, a 
clue to that terrible future, the anticipation of an event long ago but that also, hasn’t happened 
yet.36  
 
Lilian’s photograph does not have aura in Benjamin’s terms. Yet surely she is absent-present, 
here now and so real to us and yet out of reach, lost to the poison that ran through her veins 
only a decade or so before Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin. Why, according to 
Benjamin, do only the very earliest photographs admit aura, which is banished from the 
medium by the 1870s?  
 
Lilian’s photograph is just a fragment of paper on card, now reproduced as a digital image 
and projected, one of millions of very similar images of different individuals that were being 
churned out by the studio photography industry in the early twentieth century. Although she 
seems singular when I tell you her story, Lilian has also become a familiar “type”, a familiar 
photographic subject. Her picture is neither sufficiently singular nor sufficiently permanent. 
For Benjamin, it is this materiality, this solidity and sense of permanence that separates the 
subjects of Hill and Adamson’s photographs from the period of commodity capitalism to 
which Lilian’s portrait belonged.37 Capitalist modernity annihilates aura along with all that is 
solid, all those qualities of permanence and singularity that seemed to tie certain social 
classes and groups of people to a longer history, to a tradition that stretched back generations. 
 
For Benjamin, what is special about Hill and Adamson’s images is not just their technology, 
or their artistry, but the very particular historical moment in which their subjects were 
located. They have not yet fully entered modernity or commodity capitalism, the photograph 
is not yet a means to seek and affirm social status, and they are not yet reducible to ‘types’:  
they step before the camera unmarked, unlabelled.38 They are as solid and material as their 
                                                
36 Benjamin, “Little History”, 510.  
37 In aura, singularity and permanence are, Benjamin says, “tightly bound”. Benjamin, “Small History”, 84. 
38 ‘Unbescholten oder besser gesagt unbeschriftet’: translated as “with their innocence intact – or rather, without 
inscription” in “Little History”, 512, and in “Small History” as “spotless” and “blank”. I prefer “unmarked” and 
“unlabelled” because they anticipate what was to come— the typology of the photographic subject with the rise 
of the carte-de-visite and the cabinet card. 
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clothes — in Schwarz’s words again: “ cravats made of shimmering satin, waistcoats in 
glossy velvet, collars of thick fur and shawls made of soft Scottish cloth”.39  
 
Benjamin isn’t just talking about the Hill and Adamson photographs. He also writes about 
this anonymous photograph of the Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling, also from the 
1840s: Consider Schelling’s dress coat [he says] we can be confident that it will pass into 
immortality along with him; the forms which it adopts on its wearer are not unworthy of the 
creases on his face”.40 While Schwarz had emphasized the plushness of the fabrics, Benjamin 
emphasizes the way clothing moulds itself to the body. According to the writer Peter 
Stallybrass, nineteenth-century clothes-makers and repairers referred to the wrinkles in the 
sleeves of a jacket or coat as “memories”.41 From the perspective of exchange value every 
“memory” devalues the commodity, since they are markers of the passage of time, and traces 
of human use. In Schelling’s photograph, Benjamin draws our attention to the aspect of the 
coat that detracts from its commodity status and which links it to the past and to duration, the 
very aspects of clothing that would disappear from later studio photographs, as people 
presented themselves in their Sunday best or even clothes or costumes hired or borrowed 
from the photographer.  
 
A year after he wrote “A Little History of Photography”, Benjamin gave a speech where he 
talked about the French author Marcel Proust’s concept of involuntary memory, which 
describes that feeling when we find ourselves suddenly flung back into a past moment 
through the most random things, the taste of a madeline cake soaked in chamomile tea, the 
sunlight on a wall, the smell of a peach.42 Benjamin explained the concept in photographic 
terms: involuntary memories, he says are visual scenes that, “we have never seen before we 
remember them” and that are, he says, “developed in the darkroom of the lived moment”.43 
Involuntary memories appear like the image on the paper print in the tray of developer.  
 
Benjamin suggested that these Proustian involuntary memories give a sense of connection 
with a past that is convincing and materially rich, but unreliable, and it is in such experiences 
that fragments of aura persist into modernity. Involuntary memory is, he suggests, a modern 
                                                
39 Schwarz, David Octavius Hill; Benjamin, “Small History”, 70. 
40 Benjamin, “Small History”, 72. 
41 Stallybrass, “Marx’s Coat”, 196. 
42 Benjamin, “A Short Speech on Proust” cited in Hansen, “Cinema and Experience”, p.179. 
43 Benjamin, , “A Short Speech on Proust” cited in Hansen, “Cinema and Experience”, p.179. 
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product, the result of a loss of tradition and of urban and technological experiences that we 
cannot assimilate, that make us slightly battered and traumatised, on edge and in shock.44  
 
If early photography provides a kind of material or concrete version of Romantic magical 
observation, later photography provides something else: through fast flash and exposure 
times, its instantaneity is a new kind of magic. (This photograph by Harold Edgerton was 
taken in 1935, only four years after Benjamin wrote “A Little History of Photography”). 
Once the photo becomes mass-reproducible with the invention of the half-tone print and the 
wire photograph, photography also sets images travelling, incessantly multiplying, and even 
pigeons were employed, carrying both photographs and cameras aloft in the first experiments 
with animal-drones and microfilm.  
 
The invention of instantaneous photography in the 1860s sharpened the sense of 
photography’s magical qualities but also gave a misleading sense of its being a one way 
capture, a snapping of reality, a clipping of time. The time it takes to record an image, the 
exposure time of the photograph, was shortened to the time of a “twinkling of an eye”.  There 
were disputes over how long a period of time constituted an instant, or a twinkle, and it was 
generally agreed that it was about a tenth of a second.45  
 
The speeding up of photography is part of the larger experience of space-time compression in 
the nineteenth century. The Victorians called it the “annihilation of time and space” and it is 
an effect of new technological inventions that make distances seems shorter or non-existent 
because they take so little time to cross — a key example is the telegraph. It is driven by 
capitalist imperial economics, by the drive to increase profit through faster and more efficient 
international circulation of money and goods. In the case of photography, the collapse of time 
and space depended on various technical advances in optics, in photochemistry and 
mechanics, all stimulated by the new social and economic demands of a growing 
photography industry.  
 
Over the last century and a half, the term “instant photography” has gained several meanings. 
It can refer to fast exposure, and to automation: processes feel more “instant” not just because 
they take little time but also because they take little work. Kodak’s brand of instant 
                                                
44 This argument is developed, for example, in Benjamin, “On Some Motifs”.   
45 Skaife Instantaneous Photography, 9. See also Henning, Photography: The Unfettered Image, 44-7. 
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photography was premised not just on fast exposure but on automation and black-boxing. A 
black-box technology is one in which the inner workings are concealed and where the 
passage from input (taking the photographs) to output (receiving the prints) is experienced as 
relatively automatic, predictable and fast.46  The Kodak Brownie, introduced in 1900, was 
clearly box-shaped, and originally, always black. But, black-boxed instantaneity was 
perfected, not by Kodak, but by Polaroid. Polaroid cameras, introduced from the 1940s 
onwards, produced prints directly and automatically from the camera itself.47  
 
Both Kodak and Polaroid’s brands of instantaneity are brought together in the 1976 film The 
Man Who Fell To Earth (dir. Nic Roeg). The alien Newton, played by David Bowie (this is 
the teenage passion bit), sets up a company called World Enterprises. One of the things the 
company produces is a camera. Designed to resemble a Box Brownie but in silver aluminium 
rather than matt black, the camera takes 35mm film rather than the medium format film used 
in a Brownie. It also develops the film, much like a Polaroid, so that the pictures can instantly 
be viewed as print. Via such products, Newton is trying to raise the capital he hopes will save 
his own planet, but also the TV ads for his photographic products allow him to communicate 
with his far-away family. Note that Newton does not reinvent the newer technology of 
television (to which he becomes addicted) but that other box, the photographic camera. In the 
film, it is this photographic invention that fascinates the chemistry professor Nathan Bryce, 
because he cannot understand how the camera works, and causes him to start investigating 
Newton, eventually betraying him to the American government, so that the alien never makes 
it home.  
 
What looks like magic, from one perspective, looks like alien technology from another. New 
forms of photography, networked digital photographs are more automated, faster and more 
black-boxed than ever before. They are also instantly transmissible. In other words, they are 
instant in all the senses I have outlined here; they appear like a sudden thought, a flash of 
inspiration, abrupt, interruptive and impermanent, an everyday part of our lives and yet, for 
most of us, technically more incomprehensible than ever. Increasingly, such images appear to 
be embedding themselves in our lives, becoming our means of conversation and interaction 
or gesture: think of Instagram and Snapchat, but also of the way in which your mobile phone 
presses you to use emoji, those little visual symbols that act as shorthand for emotions.  
                                                
46 Tresch The Romantic Machine, 116 
47 On Polaroid’s relationship to instantaneity see Buse, The Camera does the Rest, 9-10. 
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If instant photography collapses time and space, the use of digital images (whether 
photographs or emoji) as a means of instant communication arguably risks becoming 
solipsistic, by which I mean, rather than facilitating the encounter with something alien or 
other, or expanding our imaginations, they risk leading to a circular repetition of sameness, a 
limited repertoire of the always already familiar.48 How, in this context, do we pay attention 
to this optical, technical interaction with something that comes into being in the moment of 
the interaction? And also, how do we conceive of a space for thought in the context of instant 
media? 
 
In Benjamin’s writing, Hill and Adamson’s photographs seem to invoke the Romantic 
concept of magical observation, in the way Benjamin describes the mutual meeting or 
coming together of sitter and technology. Schwarz’s description of light struggling out of the 
darkness to which it still clings, was not intended to be about freedom, but reading it through 
Schlegel and Novalis, Benjamin makes it possible to think of it that way. For these 
Romantics, the principal property of reflective thinking is its infinite nature. In thinking, we 
experience ourselves extending, reaching beyond the possible or the knowable. In thinking 
we experience a kind of freedom but its not at all comfortable or painless.  
 
Normally, when we talk about freedom we mean freedom from constraint. For example: 
freedom from oppression, from slavery, or from imprisonment. Academic freedom is often 
defined in terms of the freedom to speak out, to air one’s professional judgments, to share the 
results of one’s research, without fear of punishment; artistic freedom as the freedom to 
express oneself, to transgress the norms of society.49 
 
Remember Talleyrand? There is an argument that says that art and academia entail a kind of 
freedom but it is a freedom bought at a cost: the extent to which these things are free is the 
                                                
48 This is my own observation, but researchers writing on emoji have made similar arguments. See Stark and 
Crawford, “The Conservatism of Emoji”, 4. They argue that ' digital technology seems capable of vast potential 
but is instead used to produce a dispiriting kind of sameness, something Laura Marks terms "lame infinity" in 
her book Enfoldment and Infinity.  
49  In philosophy, freedom has two meanings, freedom from necessity (and cause) and freedom from constraint. 
It is the second meaning that is able to persist in the Anglo-American tradition and informs the concept of 
liberality. Peter Fenves points out that in this tradition “The word “freedom” remains meaningful as long as it is 
opposed to “constraint,’ and so the retreat of philosophical freedom leaves its trace in a certain 
unconstrainedness, a certain liberality, the principal characteristic of which is an ability to make everything 
possible.” Fenves, “Foreword” xviii. 
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exact extent to which they are ineffective, they sit, like the Epicurean Gods, or like 
Talleyrand, outside the storm, commenting on society but completely unable to alter its 
course. Later Benjamin would argue that photography brought the stars – or the gods —down 
to earth.50 But in “Little History of Photography”, he is suggesting something else, linking 
early photographs to the Romantic concept of the infinite freedom of thought – and this kind 
of freedom is not detached but entangled with a lively reality.  
 
Usually it is argued that what is distinctive about the photograph, what sets it apart from 
every previous kind of picture, is its appearance as a direct, unmediated piece of the real. This 
is the thing that so many photography theorists have commented on. Benjamin writes about 
this particular Hill and Adamson photograph of a Newhaven fishwife that there is (in Esther 
Leslie’s translation): “something that cannot be silenced, obstreperously demanding the name 
of she who has lived, who remains real here”.51 This is why the narrative of photography 
fixing, securing, freezing, capturing is so compelling. Photographic images seem in some 
ways to be the least free kind of images, always grounded in some kind of reality, always 
produced by a cause, by what has been, here, there, in front of the camera.  
 
Benjamin’s reading of Hill and Adamson’s pictures suggests how photography loosens the 
image, ungrounds it, extends its space for play and gives it a thought-like quality. In this 
sense, photography sets images free. Light struggles out of the darkness, slowly, reluctantly, 
agonisingly, laboriously. Like the stars that penetrate the telescope, the distance it crosses can 
be measured in years. It registers itself on the paper, but in order to do so it crosses a breach 
and there is always that which never makes it, the underexposed or unexposed, that which is 
not caught and falls between the gaps. And by analogy, art and academic study also set 
something loose, making it possible for anyone to experience that sense of their extension, of 
reaching beyond what they know or are comfortable with. Like light struggling out of the 
darkness, thought finds itself free, not out of some moral imperative or for the sheer fun of it, 
but because it is faced with a ravine across which all it can do is leap.52 The leap is not into 
thin air but into the arms of something other than ourselves, something alien, something new. 
                                                
50 I am referring to Benjamin, “The Work of Art”, where he argues that photography's reproductive capacity 
contributes to the destruction of aura. 
51 Benjamin, “Small History”, 66. 
52 This is a reference to Nancy, The Experience of Freedom:  ““It is freedom that definitively “ leaps,” or rather 
it is freedom that is the “leap,” ... The leap is therefore not a free decision of thinking... It is supported by 
nothing, and it is not thrown into the Kantian dove’s empty space—it leaps into and over nothing. It is but the 
leap of a start, a burst of existence, an unleashing that unleashes nothing more than the trembling of the existent 
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at the border of its existence. Thinking trembles with freedom: fear and impatience, luck, the experience that 
there is no thinking that would not always be given in freedom and to freedom.”  (58-9). Nancy is discussing 
Heidegger, but also the “Kantian dove” is a reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason where he writes “The 
light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be 
still easier in empty space.” (B9).The dove here is a metaphor for ungrounded philosophizing,  the kind of 
speculation unrooted in experience that had become associated with metaphysics, and from which Kant wanted 
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